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5 characteristics and behavior of specific types of investors, a broader perspective is underdeveloped so far (Hellman et al., 2017) . A more fine-grained analysis is needed, as the supply side of entrepreneurial finance ecosystems comprises a very diverse set of investor types. Since we aim to study decision-making across investor types in an encompassing way, we distinguish the following investor types.
(1) Family offices (FOs) are organizations that manage the wealth of business families by taking actions (i.e., investments) to sustain and grow their wealth (Gilding 2005 , Gray 2005 . Prominent examples of FOs include Horizons Ventures, the Hong-Kong-based FO of the Kashing family, and Madrone Capital Partners, the US-based FO of the Walton family (Walmart). Despite their economic relevance and long history, accessing information about FOs is difficult for both researchers and market participants because FOs are not required to disclose information about their investments. Quantitative information on FOs is scarce, making them a particularly attractive investor type for our experiment-based research. (2) Business angels (BAs) are wealthy individuals that invest their own money. As such, they are an important pillar of entrepreneurial finance and have become an important source of funding in recent years (Kerr et al., 2014; Hellmann and Thiele, 2015) . (3) Venture capital funds (VCs) are the best-researched investor type in entrepreneurial finance. Here, VCs serve as an important benchmark in order to be able to understand and classify differences between VCs and other investor types.
(4) Growth equity funds (GEFs) constitute an investor type that is particularly crucial in later-stage financing (Gompers et al., 2016; Ritter, 2015) . (5) Leveraged buyout funds (LBOs) constitute our final investor type (e.g., Cumming et al., 2007) . In a leveraged buyout, a company is acquired by an investment firm using a relatively small portion of equity and a relatively large portion of outside debt financing (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009 ).
We make the following contributions. First, we identify the relative importance of PE investors' investment criteria. Overall, the most important investment criteria are (1) revenue growth, (2) value-added of product/service, and (3) management team track record. International scalability, current profitability, business model, and the reputation of existing investors are relevant but of lower importance. The main aspect investigated by previous studies is, arguably, the importance placed on the management team (the "jockey",
in Kaplan et al., 2009) relative to the business model (the "horse"). Although the team has been recognized as important in some studies about VC preferences (e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004) , Kaplan et al. (2009) argue that, in theory, VCs should place more weight on business models than on management teams since companies' business lines remain stable while management turnover is substantial. Recently, Gompers et al. (2019) report
6 that 95% of the VCs in their survey mention the management team as an important factor, 47% as the most important factor. Similarly, the experiment by Bernstein et al. (2017) reveals that BAs are highly responsive to information about the founding team, whereas information about the traction and current investors does not lead to significantly increased interest. Adding to this discussion, we find that the management team is an important investment criterion for our participants. However, we also find that investors rate revenue growth and the value-added provided by the company's product or service to be more important than the management team's track record.
Second, we contribute to prior research by comparing the importance of the respective investment criteria across different investor types. While previous literature has suggested that considerable differences in the decision-making of different investor types likely exist (Lerner et al., 2007) , a systematic empirical assessment of these differences is absent. Further adding to this literature, we incorporate FOs as an investor type that prior corporate finance literature has largely neglected. Recent practitioners' reports show that while the fraction of investments by FOs in real estate has decreased over the last decade, direct equity investments have almost doubled (Bloomberg, 2014) . Considering that the 50 largest FOs account for assets under management of approximately 1,000 $b (Bloomberg, 2014) , research on the assessment of investments by FOs is both highly timely and relevant. Our study sheds light on the investment criteria of FOs and finds that, relative to other PE investors, FOs attribute greater importance to the profitability of portfolio companies but less importance to revenue growth. An explanation is that by undertaking risky decisions, the managers of FOs risk losing family wealth and jeopardize the financial and social wellbeing of future family generations. They are therefore more concerned with the conservation of irreplaceable capital through investments in already profitable companies, rather than bearing the risk -and potentially high returns -of high-growth companies.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the research design, including the sample, the descriptive statistics about the different types of investors considered in this study, and the conjoint analysis. Section 3 discusses the results of the study. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Research design

Data and sample
We identified investors and investment professionals in Pitchbook, which is one of the most comprehensive databases in entrepreneurial finance and is regularly used for research in the field of PE investments (e.g., Kaplan and Lerner, 2016; Paglia and Harjoto, 2014) . The information provided in Pitchbook is mainly based on disclosed information from limited partners, filings of national regulators, and other available public information. The advantage of Pitchbook relative to alternative data sources is that it reports information on investors' teams as well as their (individual) contact details, in addition to information on the investment entity (Brown et al., 2015) . We used this information to create our sample of investors and investment professionals, which we identified in 2016.
We first filtered Pitchbook by investor type (i.e., funds), selecting all investment entities classified as a VC fund, FO, buyout fund, or GEF, including multiple investor types. Second, we only considered investors that had done at least one equity deal in the last ten years (as of 2016) that was classified as series A, B, C, D (or later), or expansion. This was done to ensure that participants in the experiment actually had some experience with regard to PE investments. Third, we identified every investment professional in Pitchbook working for these investment entities and removed those who had missing values with regard to e-mail and/or location.
This approach led to the identification of 15,600 investment professionals which we invited via email to participate in our research. We sent a total of three reminders letters over five months and collected 749 responses (response rate = 6.24%) in total. We asked participants about the type of investor they work for as Pitchbook's classification can contain multiple classifications per investor. For example, an investor could be classified as a VC and FO simultaneously. Out of the 749 respondents, 59 (7.9%) worked for FOs, 20 (2.7%) for or as BAs, 396 (52.9%) for VCs, 189 (25.2%) for GEFs, and 85 (11.3%) for LBOs. In line with previous studies (e.g., Graham and Harvey, 2001) , the experiment was run as an anonymous survey as data collected about investment behavior is sensitive and anonymity is required to fully comply with the latest data security legislation (EU-GDPR/18 General Data Protection Regulation).
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To assess the representativeness of our sample, we first compare the participants in our experiment to the population of investors retrieved from Pitchbook. Overall, the representation of each investor type in our experiment is similar to the distribution of investor types in the full sample, as illustrated in Table 1 Europeans. The percentage of African investment professionals is significantly higher in our sample as compared to the population. However, they constitute still a small proportion of the final sample (0.9%). We, therefore, conclude that a non-response bias should not influence our results in a major way (e.g., Graham and Harvey, 2001 ).
-Please insert Table 2 about here -
We assess a potential late-response bias, which is present if early participants in the experiment show significantly different characteristics and behavior than late participants (Graham and Harvey, 2001 ). To assess 2 The fractions obtained from Pitchbook are slightly biased downwards because 23.9% of the investors are coded as "multiple investor types". In our survey, these individuals assigned themselves to the type that fit best. For example, the full population in Pitchbook contained 52.2% VCs, while our sample includes 52.9% VC.
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T 9 this bias, we split the final sample into early participants (first half of the respondents, N = 375) and late participants (second half of the respondents, N = 374) and compare their mean values with regard to individual characteristics using a t-test. The results are reported in Table 3 . For example, the results show that 85.5% of the early participants were male, while 90.3% of the late participants were male. This indicates that females were slightly under-represented among late respondents. Also, early participants were slightly more experienced than late respondents. No significant differences exist with regard to the variables age, tenure, education, entrepreneurial experience, position in the company, or work experience. Thus, the results indicate that no major differences exist between early and late participants.
-Please insert Table 3 about here -
As in all studies, external validity might be a concern. Fortunately, previous research provides considerable evidence for the external validity of conjoint studies (e.g. Louviere, 1988; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2018) . These studies generally show that the estimated decision behavior with conjoint experiments strongly correlates with real observed behavior. Shepherd and Zacharakis (2018) recommend that conjoint tasks should be representative of the participant's real tasks in order to ensure external validity. To ensure this, we conducted a pretest with experienced PE investors, who confirmed that our selection of attributes and attribute levels is an appropriate portrayal of their actual investment decisions.
Among the different types of investors, FOs might be particularly prone to concerns of external validity, as they have received scant attention in previous research. To assess the external validity of our sample of FOs, we refer to the Global Family Office Report (GFOR) (2018), which is one of the most established surveys on FOs to date. The GFOR (2018) provides information based on a sample of 311 FOs that can be used as a reference point for our sample. The GFOR (2018) shows that the most prevalent stages in which FOs invest (PE funds and direct investments) are growth stages (72%) and venture stages (57%). These values are similar to our sample, in which 73% of the FOs indicate to invest in growth stages and 66% in early stages. A distinguishing feature is that FOs, compared to the other investor types in our sample, are smaller with regard to assets under management. This is somewhat surprising as reports frequently describe FOs as extremely wealthy investors, whose assets under management revolve around 1.000 $m on average (e.g., Economist,
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T 10 2018). The GFOR similarly reports a mean value of 808 $m, while most of the FOs in our sample report assets under management between 100 and 250 $m. However, these reports also acknowledge a large variety across FOs. Unfortunately, the distribution of assets under management is not reported in the GFOR so that it is difficult to conclude whether our sample is biased downwards. With regard to syndication, the GFOR indicates that FOs tend to make co-investments instead of investing alone. Similar, FOs in our sample express a strong preference for syndication. Finally, the GFOR indicates that 38% of the FOs are headquartered in Europe, 34%
in North America, 28% in the rest of the world. This indicates that European FOs are overrepresented in our sample, constituting 60% of the participants (25% North America, 15% rest of the world).
Descriptive statistics
Each participant in the experiment was asked to fill out a questionnaire with questions on characteristics of the investment entity in which they work, characteristics of the portfolio companies, and their individual characteristics. The following subsections provide a descriptive overview of the sample and highlight the particularities of each investor type. First, Table 4 provides the definition of the variables and descriptive statistics for the full sample. The average investment professional in our sample manages between 100 and 250 $m with a target internal rate of return between 10% and 20%. About one fourth of the participants invest alone, about one half invest with one or more other investors, while the remaining one fourth is indifferent to syndication. Most of the participants in the experiment are based in Europe. Coherently, most of the investment companies in which they invest are European. The main industry of their portfolio companies is software and services. The average investment professional is male (88%), between 35 and 45 years old with 11 years of experience as investor. The educational background of most participants (79%) is business and economics.
-Please insert Table 4 about here - Table 5 provides an initial comparison of the investor types using the variables described in Table 4 .
Specifically, Table 5 Another distinguishing characteristic is that FOs' investment professionals tend to have more experience than those working for other investors, as they have, on average, worked as an investment professional for 13.5 years. Also, investment professionals from FOs have a comparatively high degree of work experience from working in startups or small and medium enterprises (SMEs). However, these investment professionals are not necessarily founders themselves as their own entrepreneurial experience is not significantly different from the remaining sample.
Business angels (BAs)
Our sample comprises 20 BAs, the least prevalent group of participants. BAs represent the smallest investor type with regard to assets under management and company size. This is due to the fact that BAs are often individual investors that invest their own money and frequently make smaller investments than other investor types (Lerner, 1998; Hellmann and Thiele, 2015) . Also, our data reflects that BAs tend to invest in very early stage companies: 70% of the sampled BAs invest in the seed stage, which is the highest value among all investor types. Simultaneously, BAs are less likely to invest in growth or later stage companies when compared with the other investor types (Hellmann and Thiele, 2015) . Investing in very early stages involves a comparatively high degree of uncertainty. One way to reduce this uncertainty and to mitigate investment risk is to engage in syndication (Block et al., 2019; Lerner, 1994) . Compared to other participants, the sampled
BAs have a strong preference to engage in syndication with multiple other investors, which is in line with prior research (e.g., Block et al., 2019; Manigart et al., 2006) . Also, investing in very early stages can lead to potentially large payoffs, in a high-risk high-reward fashion. This risky investment strategy corresponds to the fact that BAs report to have achieved a significantly higher share of investments with cash-on-cash multiples larger than factor 10.
With regard to individual characteristics, BAs are older than investment professionals in other investor types and more often have entrepreneurial experience. Again, these findings are in line with previous research which regularly describes BAs as experienced individuals that often possess substantial entrepreneurship experience (e.g., Collewaert and Manigart, 2011) . Often, previous entrepreneurial activities are one of the sources of BAs funds.
Venture capital funds (VCs)
VCs represent the largest group of investors in our sample (N = 396). While VCs are larger than FOs and BAs with regard to assets under management and company size, they are significantly smaller than GEFs and LBOs.
This is in line with prior research by Gompers et al. (2016) , who point out that GEFs and LBOs are typically larger than VCs. Also, prior research indicates that VCs are very risk-prone, which is reflected in (potentially) large and volatile returns (e.g., Cochrane, 2005) . This is reflected in our descriptive statistics: While VCs have
a significantly higher share of investments that achieve low cash-on-cash multiples than the other investor types, they also report a significantly higher share of investments with very high cash multiples.
Our descriptive statistics confirm that VCs prefer to invest more in early stages and less in later stages than other investor types. For example, 85% of the participants indicated that they invest in early-stage companies while only 9% indicated that they (also) invest in later-stage companies. However, VCs do not have a preference for seed-stage investments that is as pronounced as for BAs. Like BAs, VCs have a general preference for syndication with one or multiple investors. Again, syndication is frequently used as a strategy to mitigate risk, especially in early stage investments that contain a high degree of uncertainty (Gompers et al., 2016) .
With regard to individual characteristics of the investment professionals, participants working for VCs had less experience working as investors, less often had a business education, and more often had a background in natural sciences or engineering as compared to the remaining sample. Also, participants working for VCs reported high levels of entrepreneurial experience (second only to BAs) and a high amount of work experience from startups or SMEs instead of large companies.
Growth equity funds (GEFs)
Our sample contains 189 participants from GEFs. With regard to both assets under management and number of investments professionals, GEFs are significantly larger than FOs, BAs, and VCs. This is in line with prior research by Gompers et al. (2016) and Ritter (2015) , who state that GEFs tend to be larger than most VCs but usually smaller than LBOs. GEFs constitute an investor type that is particularly crucial in later-stage financing (Gompers et al., 2016; Ritter, 2015) . This is reflected in our descriptive statistics, which show that a significantly higher fraction of GEFs invests in later stages as compared to other investors. In particular, 91% stated that they invest in growth-/expansion-stage portfolio companies.
Later-stage investments generally entail a lower investment risk (Gompers et al., 2016; Ritter, 2015) . This is because, at that stage, companies typically have a functioning product and business model and have experienced initial market success. Moreover, company performance measures are more readily available and can be used as investment criteria. The lower investment risk in later-stage deals corresponds to less volatility in investment returns (Cochrane, 2005) . In contrast to other PE investors, GEFs achieve a significantly smaller fraction of investments with low cash-on-cash multiples and a significantly higher ratio of cash multiples between 2 and 5 (48% of their investments). Also, since syndication is a means to reduce investment risk, GEFs tend to engage less in syndication and more often invest alone as compared to the other investor types.
GEFs primarily invest in growth-and expansion-stage companies. This specialization is also reflected in individual-level statistics. For example, own entrepreneurial experience of the investment professional may be less important than when investing in later-stage companies compared to investing in early-stage ventures.
Compared to the early-stage investor types in our sample, individuals working in GEFs indeed have less often own entrepreneurial experience and work experience from working in startups or SMEs versus work experience from large companies. Finally, our results show that they more often have a business education, which may be useful when it comes to scaling, instead of developing business models.
Leveraged buyout funds (LBOs)
Our sample contains 85 participants from LBOs, which represent the largest investor type in terms of assets under management and number of investment professionals. This is in line with prior research, which frequently highlights LBOs as an important asset class being substantially larger than other types of PE investors (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Metrick and Yasuda, 2010) .
Typically, LBOs invest in mature companies. This is different from investors like VCs and BAs, which typically invest in young or emerging companies (e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Metrick and Yasuda, 2010) . Indeed, our descriptive statistics show that the share of seed-and early-stage investments is significantly smaller with LBOs than with other investor types, whereas the fraction of investments in later-stage companies is significantly larger. For investment in mature companies investment uncertainty is lower. Our results reflect this, as LBOs tend to engage in syndication less often; 67% of LBOs prefer to invest alone. The lower likelihood of syndication may also be related to LBO's large size, which makes syndication less necessary in order to raise large funding volumes. Cochrane (2005) finds that later-stage deals have less volatility than early-stage deals with regard to returns. This is reflected in LBOs investment success: With regard to cash-on cash multiples, LBOs have significantly lower ratios of very low and very high values and have significantly higher values in between. 85% of their investments achieve multiples between 1 and 5.
Finally, prior studies acknowledge that LBOs create value through significant managerial improvements (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Rigamonti et al., 2016) . However, more mature companies already possess management skills so that LBOs are required to provide a different set of supporting activities than VCs do. Metrick and Yasuda (2010) find that LBO investors build on their prior experience by increasing the size of their funds faster than VC managers do. They also describe that LBO investors add value to extremely large companies, whereas a VC manager's skill can add value only to small companies. This has implications for individuals working for LBOs. As reflected in our descriptive statistics, individual's working for LBOs have less entrepreneurial experience and have more often gained work experience in larger companies than individuals working for other investor types. This set of experiences likely enables them to contribute to developing large companies better than individuals who have experience from working in small and entrepreneurial companies.
Experimental design of the conjoint analysis
As the main part of our study, we conduct an experimental conjoint analysis to elicit the decision-making behavior of PE investors. This technique requires participants to make a series of assessments based on a fixed set of attributes. With this approach, decision criteria can be measured conjointly in a multivariate way, allowing a more accurate representation of the actual decision behavior and the underlying preference structure. This approach is frequently used in the context of investor decision-making due to the limitations of post hoc approaches such as questionnaires and interviews (e.g., Shepherd and Zacharakis 1999) . For example, information is collected as the decision is being made, whereas post-hoc methods collect data about a decision after the decision has been made. Therefore, conjoint studies overcome limitations that affect post hoc approaches, such as a self-reporting or recall bias. We use a choice-based conjoint analysis (CBC) in which objects (here: companies) that consist of several attributes (here: revenue growth, profitability, reputation of current investors, etc.) are evaluated by participants (here: investment professionals). Participants are asked to make a deterministic investment decision between several hypothetical portfolio companies that differ only in the specifications of the company attributes (e.g., 20% revenue growth for company 1 versus 50% revenue growth for company 2). Before asking the participants to make a series of decisions on such hypothetical entrepreneurial companies, participants were provided with information on the study and the decision tasks that they were going to face. An important advantage of our experimental setting is that we were able to provide respondents with a very detailed description of the (hypothetical) companies they were going to assess in the conjoint experiment. To ensure that the participants in our experiment were thinking about similar (or the same) company when making their investment decision, we included an introductory slide outlining our understanding of the hypothetical companies. They were told that they would be confronted with two different companies that are in a stage of early growth or expansion and clarified that companies have market traction, a validated business model, multiple paying customers, growth in sales and customers, and multiple employees. To avoid conflicts with the generic screening criteria of investors, the presented companies were said to match the geographical, industrial and investment size preferences of the participants (Franke et al., 2008) .
To identify a list of typical screening criteria used by PE investors, we proceeded in two steps. First, we derived a list of possible criteria from prior research (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2017; Franke et al., 2008; Puri and Zarutskie, 2012) . Second, we conducted 19 expert interviews with PE investors from Europe and the US to identify the most relevant criteria used by different investor types. These experts represent several investor types (e.g., VCs, FOs, GEFs). The interviews were transcribed and coded by two researchers to identify the most relevant criteria, which formed the basis of the conjoint study. 3 Based on this procedure, we derived a list of company attributes and attribute levels. The identified attributes are (1) profitability, (2) revenue growth,
track record of the management team, (4) reputation of current investors, (5) business model, (6) value-
added of product/service, and (7) international scalability. These attributes or investment criteria are in line with and extend criteria mentioned in previous research, such as Bernstein et al. (2017) . Our business model measure is based on the seminal work of Amit and Zott (2001) . Table 6 provides a detailed description of our operationalization of these criteria as well as their respective levels. In addition to the attributes, Table 6 also outlines the respective attribute levels and their descriptions. For example, the attribute "revenue growth"
comprised the attribute levels "10% p.a.", "20% p.a.", "50% p.a.", and "100% p.a". All descriptions outlined in Table 6 were also shown to the participants in our conjoint experiment.
-Please insert Table 6 about hereSince PE investors assess potential investments holistically, we employ a full-profile CBC, which means that all attributes from Table 6 are presented to investors at once. CBC is used in conjunction with a reduced conjoint design (Chrzan and Orme 2000), as participants would otherwise be exposed to too many decision tasks if combinations between all possible variations of attribute levels were presented. Furthermore, the experimental design is asymmetric because the number of attribute levels across attributes is not equal. 4 We created 800 different experimental designs, with each presenting a different sequence of choice tasks with different combinations of attribute levels. Each design consists of the 7 attributes outlined in Table 6 whose levels were randomly assigned to two investment opportunities. Each participant is asked to select one of the two alternatives in 15 choice tasks. While 13 of these tasks were randomly assigned, 2 were the same for all participants. These "fixed" tasks were used to determine the test-retest reliability of the participants' choices in the study. Figure 1 provides an illustration of a choice task that each participant faced 15 times with varying attribute levels. On average, each choice task took the participants 21 seconds to complete, which is in line with other research (Johnson and Orme, 1996) .
-Please insert Figure 1 about here -
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18 CBC studies can suffer from three types of order effects (Chrzan 1994), which we account for: (1) the order of choice tasks, (2) the order of options in a choice task, and (3) the order of attributes within a choice task. To circumvent the effect of the choice task order, we created 800 different experimental designs with the choice tasks within each design being randomly ordered. To avoid the effect of the order of options in a given choice task, the two options within the 800 different experimental designs are randomly ordered within the respective choice tasks. To circumvent the effect of the order of attributes within a choice task, the order presented to participants is randomized across participants but kept stable within one participant. In addition, the participants are randomly allocated to one of the 800 experimental designs. Also, we conducted a pre-test with four experienced investors and four researchers who had previously conducted research on investor decision-making to confirm the face validity of both the attributes as well as the complexity and number of the choice tasks. The two fixed tasks were used to check the test-retest reliability of the participants' choices in the study. By assessing the ability of the utilities from the 13 random choice tasks to predict the two fixed choice tasks, a proxy for test-retest reliability can be estimated. 5 In our study, this method leads to an 80% accuracy of correct classification.
Finally, to explore the importance attached to the different investment criteria, we performed multilevel logistic regression models. The investment decision made by the investment professionals serves as the binary dependent variable (1 if the investor chose the respective portfolio company; 0 if he did not), while the different attribute levels constitute our independent variables. We use a multilevel regression because our observations of investment decisions are nested and effects on multiple levels (particularly cross-level interaction) are evaluated at the same time. Two levels exist within our data: multiple decisions (level one) are nested within each individual (level two) and cannot be viewed as independent from each other.
Results
In this section, we present the results of our analysis in three steps. First, we show and discuss the relative importance of the different investment criteria. Then, we compare the importance of the decision criteria across investor types. Last, we apply a propensity score methodology as a robustness check. Table 7 reports the results of the regression analysis. Model 1 uses the full sample while Models 2-6 consider each investor type separately. The coefficients indicate the importance investors attach to each criterion.
Relative importance of investment criteria
-Please insert Table 7 about hereModel 1 shows that all included attribute levels significantly influence the decision of the investor (p < 0.001) with the exception of the attribute level current investors -unfamiliar. Participants were found to be indifferent between the absence of current investors and the presence of current investors that are unfamiliar to them. However, investors significantly favor the presence of reputable investors over their lack of presence.
The results displayed in Table 7 To further illustrate the weight attached to each criterion, we estimate the relative importance of each attribute following Franke et al. (2008) . The values displayed in Figure 2 allow an assessment of how strong a change in an attribute's level does affect the total utility of a proposed company. The higher the value, the higher the contribution of the respective attribute to the company's total utility value. To enable a better comparison, the values are normalized (zero-centered) such that the sum of all importance values yields 100.
Overall, the chance of a positive screening decision is strongly affected by high values in the attributes of (1) revenue growth, (2) value-added of product/service, and (3) To address this issue, Table 8 estimates separate regressions where the importance of investment criteria
Differences across investor types
for each investor type is tested against the rest of the sample. For example, Model 1 of Table 8 compares the effect of FOs against the combined group of BAs, VCs, GEFs, and LBOs. As such, the coefficients displayed are interaction effects that enable a statement on whether the importance of each criterion differs significantly from the rest of the sample, enabling statements as to where each investor type stands out from the other investors. The following paragraphs refer to the respective models for each investor type.
-Please insert Table 8 about here -
Investment criteria of family offices (FOs)
Model 1 of Table 8 compares FO's investment criteria to the investment criteria of the other investor types.
The results show that FOs differ with regard to the importance attached to profitability and revenue growth. In particular, FOs consider profitability significantly more important than other investor types and attach significantly less importance to high levels of revenue growth. No significant differences emerge regarding the remaining investment criteria.
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An explanation for the distinct preference of profitability lies in the fact that financial goals are likely to be different for FOs relative to other investors. While the return on investment is naturally important, it is intermingled with objectives of wealth preservation. FOs, whose goals are determined by the families to which they belong or for which they work, are often conservative and risk-averse and thus more reluctant to pursue high-risk investments (Wessel et al. 2014) . By undertaking risky decisions, the managers of FOs risk losing family wealth and jeopardize the financial and social wellbeing of future family generations. They are therefore more concerned with the conservation of irreplaceable capital, often accumulated over generations, rather than potential high returns. Indeed, the mission of FOs is to protect and preserve assets for future generations. A survey by Bloomberg (2017) finds that the main objective of FOs is intergenerational wealth management.
Since companies with poor profitability are associated with a high risk of bankruptcy (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008 ), FOs will consider such investments to be high-risk investments. Therefore, they will tend to avoid such investments, explaining our findings.
Similarly, while current profitability reflects an investment associated with lower risk, high growth potentially incurs uncertainty, as it exposes entrepreneurial companies to additional challenges and risks (e.g., 
Investment criteria of business angels (BAs)
Model 2 of Table 8 focusses on BAs. A particularity of BA's investment decision is that they focus less on profitability than other investors. An explanation is that BAs primarily invest in early-stage companies (Hellmann and Thiele, 2015) , which involves a comparatively high degree of uncertainty. In these companies, profitability is of minor importance as they are often not mature enough to achieve profits. Having achieved profitability, in turn, is a sign of a healthy business model and a strong competitive position. Typical companies targeted by BAs still need to achieve legitimacy by proving that their products fulfill market needs and provide value to their customers. In this regard, revenue growth can be perceived as a sign of market acceptance.
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Additionally, BAs prefer not to invest in companies with business models that keep customers "lockedin", such as those having high switching costs to prevent customers from changing to other providers. Relative to other types of investors, BAs disfavor locked-in business models for innovation-centered or low-cost business models (i.e., focusing on reducing costs for customers for already existing products or services).
Investment criteria of venture capital funds (VCs)
Model 3 of Table 8 focusses on the investment criteria of VCs. Like BAs and in contrast to the other investor types in our sample, VCs attribute significantly less importance to profitability. Also, VCs attribute significantly more importance to high levels of revenue growth. These findings are both in line with prior literature, in which VC investments are generally characterized as high risk and high growth (Ueda, 2004) . For example, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) show that VCs invest in companies with no immediate revenues and focus on scalability instead of profitability. In our results, this higher scalability is reflected in VC's increased interest in revenue growth. An explanation is that VCs need to deliver returns to their partners over a relatively short period of time, which incentivizes them to take riskier investments. The short investment horizon of VC funds and the investors behind them exacerbate the short-termism of general partners (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004) , who are asked to provide high returns by capital providers. All else being equal, high returns are more difficult to achieve in already profitable companies, whereas the higher risk of entrepreneurial companies is associated with higher chances of high growth rates. In addition, the incentives that principals (limited partners) set for fund managers (general partners) (i.e., to select investments with the potential to generate high returns) are paralleled at the individual level. Similar to mutual fund managers, their professional identity stems from their reputation in the market, which is to a large degree gained and sustained through their investment track record (Chevalier and Ellison 1999; Kempf and Ruenzi, 2007) . Fund managers who do not provide high returns to their investors will find it hard to secure further funding and suffer from a reduced labor market value. In addition to monetary returns, other motivations for VC investment professionals involve status and the desire to outcompete their peers. These motivations are reflected in the characteristics of the entrepreneurial companies that they seek. A company with high current profitability does not represent the ideal setting for possibly outperforming others and gaining popularity as a fund manager.
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The findings also show that VCs have a preference for funding companies in which Tier 1 investors are present. The presence of reputable investors is a key aspect in VC investments as it allows VC funds to command a premium from future entrepreneurs (Hsu, 2004) and makes future investment fundraising easier (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Nahata, 2008) . Moreover, VCs with broader networks obtain better financial returns (Hochberg et al., 2007) and mitigate the risks (Lerner, 1994) .
Finally, the results show that VCs prefer innovation-centered business models. Again, this is in line with a strategy that is overall more risk-prone and focusses on a high-risk high reward tradeoff.
Investment criteria of growth equity funds (GEFs)
Model 4 of Table 8 focusses on the investment criteria of GEFs. Like FOs and in contrast to BAs and VCs, GEFs attach higher importance to portfolio companies' profitability. This corresponds to the results of Ritter (2015), who describes that GEFs frequently invest in companies that are already profitable. Regarding revenue growth, our results show a general preference for revenue growth, as GEFs consider a revenue growth of 20% or 50% to be more important than other investor types do. Interestingly, GEFs do not seem to rate a very high revenue growth of 100% to be more important than other investors do. This is a difference to VCs, which differ from other investors regarding the importance attached to very high levels of revenue growth.
Another peculiarity of GEFs is that they consider it comparably important that all management team members have a relevant track record. Also, GEFs attach less importance to the presence of reputable investors.
An explanation is that the presence of other investors can generate severe conflicts of interest and agency problems. For example, freeriding behavior can occur, incurring costs associated with monitoring or sanctioning opportunistic behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . The costs associated with co-investing are higher in the presence of a reputable investor. For example, co-investing generally leads to a higher likelihood of difficult negotiations between the parties involved (Fried and Hisrich 1995).
GEFs attach less importance than other investor types to innovation-centered business models and the value-added of a portfolio company's products and services. An explanation could be that companies with innovation-centered business models as well as high-value products may serve niche markets and are therefore difficult to grow and scale.
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Investment criteria of leveraged buyout funds (LBOs)
Model 5 of Table 8 explores the investment criteria of LBOs in contrast to the other investor types. Like FOs and GEFs, LBOs attach relatively higher importance to portfolio companies' profitability. The effect is very pronounced and highly significant. In contrast, LBOs attach a significantly lower importance to revenue growth than other investor types. Regarding the importance of profitability and revenue growth, LBOs hence present the opposite investor type to VCs. While VCs focus on high scalability of companies (Puri and Zarutskie, 2012) , this indicates that scalability may not be of interest to LBOs. Instead, LBOs are more prone to invest in already profitable companies, as they are a less risky investment.
LBOs give less importance to the management team as compared to other types of investors. This might be due to their tendency to replace management teams that they see unfit (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009) .
Hence, the current management team is considered not so important. Like GEFs, LBOs pay less attention to the presence of reputable investors. As discussed in the previous section, the presence of reputable investors might make it more difficult for LBOs to pursue their own goals. Finally, similar to GEFs, LBOs attach lower importance to innovation-centered business models.
Robustness tests and further analyses
To test the robustness of our results and to further explore these results, we performed a set of robustness checks and additional analyses, summarized in Table 9 . In our main analysis, we compared each investor type against all other investor types included in our sample. While this comparison highlights the peculiarities of the respective investor's investment criteria in contrast to the other investor types, we now investigate differences in the importance of investment criteria in selected pairs of investor types. This more specific analysis allows us to explore differences between specific investor types in a more nuanced way that may have In addition, we use propensity score matching to make subsamples comparable in terms of investor and investment professional characteristics. As these differences might influence investment decisions, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to reduce the potential bias and further improve our comparisons across ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
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25 investor types. We match individuals from different investor types according to their individual characteristics (Table 4 , panel C). We used a k-nearest neighbor (KNN) approach with 1-to-1 matching which matches a pair of observations that are the most related.
-Please insert Table 9 about here -
Comparison between family offices and venture capital funds
Model 1a (Table 9) In contrast to our main analysis, the results further show that in contrast to VCs, FOs attach significantly lower importance to the presence of reputable investors in the portfolio company. This effect can be attributed to VCs high preference for the presence of reputable investors as a signal certifying company quality (Hsu 2004 , Hochberg et al. 2007 ). In contrast to VCs, FOs may be more reluctant to partner with prominent investors because the costs associated with co-investing are higher for FOs in the presence of a reputable investor. For example, co-investing generally leads to a higher likelihood of difficult negotiations between the parties involved (Fried and Hisrich 1995) . If the co-investing party is a reputable investor, then the FO will have a weaker negotiation position that discourages co-investing. Additionally, it is more difficult for a family office to sanction the opportunistic behavior of a reputable investor compared to more unknown investors. Also, reputable investors are more likely to be active and shape their portfolio companies (Johnson and Swem 2017) as well as introduce high-growth policies to accelerate faster public markets that are incoherent with the capital preservation goals of FOs. Notice, however, that this effect does not persist when reducing the sample of VCs via PSM (Model 1b).
Comparison between family offices and business angels
Model 2a (Table 9 ) compares the investment criteria of FOs (N = 59) and BAs (N = 20). Both investor types share similarities, as they are non-intermediated, tied to personal/family wealth, possibly confounded with non-financial motives, and represent the smallest investor types in our sample (with regard to assets under management). We find that FOs put a comparatively higher emphasis on profitability and a lower emphasis on revenue growth. While these differences (especially with regard to the importance of revenue growth) are not as pronounced, they correspond to the results of our main analysis. Model 2b reports the results of the regression performed after PSM. The drop in significance can be at least partially attributed to the decreased sample sizes (N = 79 for Model 2a, N = 40 for Model 2b). Further differences emerge with regard to the importance of selected business models and international scalability. FOs have a higher preference for lock-in business models than BAs. This higher preference is mainly due to BAs aversion against lock-in business models, as shown in the main analysis ( 
Comparison between growth equity funds and leveraged buyouts
Model 3a (Table 9 ) compares the investment criteria of GEFs (N = 189) and LBOs (N = 85). GEFs and LBOs constitute investor types that are particularly crucial in later-stage financing and are often treated as the same group of investors (e.g., Gompers et al., 2016; Ritter, 2015) . Indeed, our main analysis suggests that GEFs and LBOs are rather similar in their investment preferences. However, the more nuanced robustness checks uncover differences between both investor types when comparing them directly.
Major differences between GEFs and LBOs exist with regard to the importance of profitability as an investment criterion. While GEFs attach less importance to high levels of profitability, high profitability is crucial to LBOs. This difference was not apparent in our main analyses, as GEFs attach higher importance to profitability than all other investor types, which is mainly driven by VCs. In addition, the results show that GEFs attach higher importance to the management team's track record and lower importance to the value-
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27 added of the portfolio company's product or service than LBOs. Both effects are in line with the results of the main analysis. Also, utilizing PSM (Model 3b) to produce a more robust comparison shows that the results remain similar.
Comparison between venture capital funds and growth equity funds plus leveraged buyouts
VCs, GEFs, and LBOs represent the major investor types in our sample. Gompers et al. (2016) describe that considerable differences in the behavior between VCs on the one side and the GEFs and LBOs should exist.
We explore these differences in Model 4a (Table 9 ) compares the investment criteria of VCs (N = 396) to
GEFs and LBOs combined (N = 274). However, the results are largely in line with the results of the main model. This is not surprising, as the sample used here (N = 670) covers 89% of the investment professionals in our entire sample (N = 749). For example, VCs put less emphasis on profitability and significantly more emphasis on high revenue growth. They also attach higher importance to the presence of reputable investors, innovation-centered business models, and a higher value-added of the company's product or services. The results remain similar when reducing the sample using PSM (Model 4b), confirming the robustness of our results.
Conclusions
PE investors place a heavy emphasis on their ability to select promising companies. In spite of the large interest in the decision-making of PE investors, this study is among the first to assess the investment criteria of these investors. While there is an established literature on the characteristics and behavior of specific types of investors, a broader perspective is underdeveloped. We compare the investment criteria of different types of investors using a large-scale conjoint analysis of 19,474 screening decisions by 749 private equity investors.
The conjoint experiment enables a better understanding of the investment criteria of investors and allows a comparison of these criteria across investor types. We distinguish FOs, BAs, VCs, GEFs, and LBOs.
In Table 10 , we provide a summary of the many insights of the paper. For instance, we find that the management team is an important investment criterion for our participants. However, we also find that investors rate revenue growth and the value-added provided by the company's product or service to be more important than the management team's track record. The importance attached to the management team does not significantly vary across investors. Second, we find two opposite views with regard to profitability. On one hand, the investment criteria of FOs, GEFs, and LBOs are centered on highly profitable companies, BAs and VCs pay less attention to the current profitability of their targets and instead focus on their scalability.
Third, our study sheds light for the first the investment criteria of FOs and finds that, relative the average of other PE investors, FOs attribute greater importance to current profitability of portfolio companies but less importance to their revenue growth. An explanation is that by undertaking risky decisions, the managers of FOs risk losing family wealth and jeopardize the financial and social wellbeing of future family generations.
They are therefore more concerned with the conservation of irreplaceable capital through investments in already profitable companies, rather than bearing the risk -and potentially high returns -of high-growth companies.
-Please insert Table 10 about here - Tables   Table 1. Sample selection and representativeness.
This table compares the composition of the population of 15,600 investors in Pitchbook with our sample of 749 participants that took part in our experiment. The initial population was first filtered from Pitchbook by investor type (i.e., funds). Investors needed to be classified as a venture capital fund, corporate venture capital fund, family office, buyout fund, or growth equity fund. As a second requirement, we considered only investors that had done at least one equity deal in the last ten years (as of 2016) that was classified as series A, B, C, D (or later), or expansion. Third, we identified every individual investor (= person) listed in Pitchbook working for these investors and removed those individuals who had missing values with regard to email and/or location. This approach led to the identification of 15,600 individual investors which we invited via email to participate in our research. We sent a total of three reminders letters over five months. In total, we collected 749 responses (response rate = 6.24%). We asked participants about the type of investor they work for (self-selection) as Pitchbook's classifications can contain multiple classifications per investor. For example, an investor could be classified as a VC and FO simultaneously. To assess whether a non-response bias potentially influences our results, we compare our initial sample (N =15,600) to our final sample (N = 749) along with several characteristics that were recorded in Pitchbook. The first column reports the mean values in the initial population. The second column reports the mean values of our final sample. The final column reports the difference between the mean values along wit h the significance of ztests for proportions. Significant values indicate statistically significant differences. * < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. To assess whether a late-response bias potentially influences our results, we compare the first half of our participants (N = 375) to the second half of our respondents (N = 374) along with their individual characteristics several characteristics. The first column reports the mean values in the first half of the respondents. The second column reports the mean values of the second half of the participants. The final column reports the difference between the mean values along with the significance of z-tests for proportions. Significant values indicate statistically significant differences. All variables are defined in Table 4 . * < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table outlines differences in the mean values across the different investor types included in our sample. While the first column depicts the mean values of the full sample (N = 749 individuals), the following columns refer to family offices (FOs), business angels (BAs), venture capital funds (VCs), growth equity funds (GEFs), and leveraged buyout funds (LBOs). Panel A outlines differences across variables related to characteristics of the investment entity. Panel B outlines differences across variables related to characteristics of the portfolio companies, while panel C outlines differences across variables related to individual-level variables of the participants. The signs in brackets (+/-) indicate whether the respective mean value is significantly larger (+) or smaller (-) than the mean value of the remaining sample. A t-test is used to calculate the significance for each individual mean value. The final column reports the significance level obtained from an analysis of variance (ANOVA), indicating statistically significant differences across groups. All variables are defined in Table 2 . * < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table shows the results of a clustered logistic regression with random intercepts and random slopes. The dependent variable is the preference of decision maker and the independent variables are the attribute levels described in Table 4 . Odds Rat ios and standard errors (clustered at the decision maker level) are displayed. Model 1 uses the full sample and shows that all attribute levels significantly influence the decision of the investor (p < 0.001) with the exception of Current investor: external investorsunfamiliar. The coefficients indicate the importance investors attach to each criterion. For example, the effect sizes of the attribute levels for revenue growth are particularly high. Companies with a revenue growth rate of 100% p.a. have an odds-ratio of 4.86, indicating that these companies have a 4.86 times higher chance of a positive screening decision (selection) by an investor relative to companies with a 10% growth rate. In contrast, the effect sizes for profitability are comparatively low. With an odds ratio of 2.46, profitable companies have a 2.46 higher chance of being selected by a decision maker than unprofitable companies. Models 2-6 consider each investor type separately and enable an initial comparison of the investment criteria's importance for each investor type. We consider family offices (FOs), business angels (BAs), venture capital funds (VCs), growth equity funds (GEFs), and leveraged buyout funds (LBOs). For example, the OR of 7.071 for LBOs with regard to profitability is considerably higher than the OR of 2.460 for the whole sample. This indicates that being profitable is a much more important criterion for LBOs t hen for other investor types. * < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T 41 This table shows the results of a clustered logistic regression with random intercepts and random slopes. The dependent variable is the preference of decision maker and the independent variables are the attribute levels described in Table 4 . Logits and standard errors (clustered at the decision maker level) are displayed. Each attribute level is interacted with the respective investor category. For example, in Model 1 every attribute level is interacted with a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respective decision maker worked in a family office, and 0 if not. The main effects are included in the estimation but are omitted for reasons of brevity so that the coefficients displayed here only refer to interaction effects. However, the main effects are qualitatively similar to the effects displayed in Model 1 of Table 5 . Focusing on the interaction effects enables us to identify significant differences between each investor type vs. the remaining investor types. For example, the results of Model 1 show that family offices attribute significantly more importance to "Profitability: profitable" in comparison to the rest of the sample. In contrast, "Profitability: profitable" is significantly less important to venture capital funds when compared with the rest of the sample. We consider family offices (FOs), business angels (BAs), venture capital funds (VCs), growth equity funds (GEFs), and leveraged buyout funds (LBOs). * < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) Exemplary choice task presented to participants. In this choice task, every participant was asked to select the company that presents a more attractive investment opportunity for him. Each participant was presented with 15 different choice tasks. While the seven attributes of the companies were fixed throughout these choice tasks (e.g., "current investors", "international scalability"), the attribute levels (e.g., "external investors -unfamiliar to you", "Easy") were varied across choice tasks in a random manner (we performed a choice-based conjoint analysis with a reduced design). All attributes and attribute levels are described in Table 6 .
Figure 2.
Relative importance of attributes. Calculated based on the coefficients of the main model ( Relative importance (proportion of total utility explained)
